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Entrepreneurship is not only used to create a business idea, but also to restructure a 
business in response to environmental conditions. Firms that issue equity after emerging from 
bankruptcy are unique in that they exhibit less asymmetric information than other firms that 
issue equity. They were previously subject to the SEC disclosure requirements when they had 
publicly-traded securities, and were required to disclose information about their assets, 
liabilities, and governance while operating under Chapter 11 bankruptcy laws. Our analysis 
determines that the mean underpricing of the firms that engaged in public stock offerings after 
emerging from bankruptcy is 4.49 percent, while the mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs 
is 15.53 percent. A multivariate analysis reinforces the lower degree of underpricing of public 
offerings by firms that emerged from bankruptcy, while controlling for other characteristics 
that could affect the level of underpricing. We also find that the aftermarket stock price 
performance of the firms that emerged from bankruptcy is more favorable than that of 
traditional IPOs. All results are attributed to a lower degree of asymmetric information 
associated with public stock offerings by firms that emerge from bankruptcy.  
 
Introduction 
When a firm reorganizes under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, stockholders are commonly left 
with no equity; the company‟s liabilities are restructured, some creditors receive new equity; 
and some of the company‟s assets may have been sold. The reorganized company is under the 
control of new owners, directors and management. Entrepreneurship is required to restructure a 
new business plan, which must include a strategy to finance the business that emerges from 
bankruptcy. After emerging from bankruptcy, the firm may undertake an equity offering to 
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raise capital for investment and financing purposes and to create a market in which the new 
owners can convert their shareholdings into cash. Such an equity offering is a special type of 
initial public offering (IPO).  
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings are distinctly different from traditional IPOs. They 
typically represent a reentry into the stock market. Many bankrupt firms had at one time 
publicly traded securities and were subject to SEC disclosure requirements. Hence, there is 
likely to be substantially more information available to investors to assess the expected market 
value of these firms upon their subsequent return to public ownership. Second, the dynamics of 
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings provide information to the public regarding assets, liabilities, 
governance and internal controls of the firm emerging from bankruptcy.  
These firms have more transparency, so that their public offerings should be subject to a 
smaller degree of asymmetric information than the traditional IPOs. Since underpricing is 
commonly attributed to asymmetric information, firms emerging from bankruptcy that engage 
in public offerings should exhibit less underpricing. To the extent that these firms experience a 
more limited jump in stock price on the offer date, they are less susceptible to a long-term 
downward drift in price over time. Our goal is to assess the underpricing and long-term stock 
price performance of firms that engage in public stock offerings after emerging from 
bankruptcy. We find that underpricing is less pronounced in post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
than in traditional IPOs. In addition, these equity offering do not exhibit any reversal in returns 
in the long-run.  
 
Information During the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process 
Once a company files for bankruptcy, it is also engaged in an information dissemination 
process. Upon entering bankruptcy, it must file a written disclosure statement and a plan of 
reorganization with the bankruptcy court. The disclosure statement is a document that contains 
information regarding the assets, liabilities and business affairs of the company, so that 
creditors can make an informed judgment about the plan of reorganization.
1
 The plan should 
divulge all of the company‟s liabilities and how they are restructured. While operating under 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, firms are required to make extensive, regular disclosures of their 
financial and operating data to the court. Additional information is contained in the court 
testimony of expert witnesses, management and creditors (see Gilson, John and Lang (1990) 
for more details).  
At the end of the bankruptcy process, information on the firm‟s value is confirmed 
through the reorganization plan. Media releases, the disclosure statement, the regular accounts 
of financial and operating data and the plan of reorganization constitute a unique set of 
information about the bankrupt company that is available to the public to determine the net 
worth of the company upon its emergence from bankruptcy. Also, given that a bankruptcy 
judge presides over the administration of a bankruptcy case and that the U.S. bankruptcy 
system requires transparency and accountability; the credibility of the information revealed 
during the bankruptcy process is further enhanced. For this reason, the extent of information 
asymmetry that may exist between the company and the market is low.  
 
IPO Underpricing  
IPO underpricing has averaged 19 percent over time (see Ritter and Welch (2002)). 
Various reasons for underpricing have been offered, such as to signal good quality (Allen and 
Falhauber (1989)), to develop a reputation among investors (Ritter and Welch (2002)), to 
                                                 
1
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solicit information from investors about potential interest (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Sherman and Titman (2002)), to facilitate marketing (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)), to avoid 
future lawsuit from investors (Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor (1992)), and to motivate the 
underwriter (Baron (1982)). Most of these reasons and their justifications are based on the 
existence of some type of asymmetric information in the IPO process. Asymmetric information 
leads to ex ante uncertainty about the true value of the firm. 
 Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) test the asymmetric information hypothesis and the 
underpricing of IPOs by comparing a sample of IPOs that previously underwent a leveraged 
buyout (LBO) with a control sample of non-LBO IPOs. They argue that the uncertainty about 
the value of the LBOs should be substantially reduced because of the availability of public 
information before the IPO. Using a sample of LBOs and a control sample of non-LBO IPOs, 
they find average underpricing of 2.04% for the LBOs and 7.97% for the control sample. In 
another related study, Ang and Brau (2002) show that firms going public that are more 
transparent incur lower issuance costs. In their study, the size- and date-matched control sample 
consisting of non-LBO firm-commitment IPOs displays greater underpricing than does their 
LBO sample, 8.04% vs. 5.47%. Results of these two studies suggest that IPOs by firms that 
were previously publicly traded are less underpriced than other IPOs.  
 
II. Hypotheses  
 Because post-bankruptcy offerings are unique, they may exhibit pricing characteristics 
that differ from traditional IPOs.  
 
A. Hypothesis About Underpricing  
Like LBO firms, the firms that filed for Chapter 11 were once publicly traded, and this 
type of information should increase transparency.  These firms were required to disclose 
information in the bankruptcy reorganization process, we hypothesize that they exhibit a lower 
degree of underpricing than traditional IPOs.  
 However, we consider a counter hypothesis. When firms reorganize, their previous 
business operations may have been altered, as their reorganization is finalized. This could 
create more uncertainty about their future performance. In addition, a previous bankruptcy may 
create some suspicion in the minds of investors, which could add to the uncertainty. Some 
investors may require that the price of equity of a bankrupt firm be discounted more to 
compensate for concerns due to its previous performance as a public company. These forces 
allow for the possibility of a greater degree of underpricing in post-bankruptcy offerings than in 
traditional IPOs.  
 
B. Hypothesis About Long-run Stock Price Performance 
In general, studies have found weak stock price performance following public stock 
offerings (see, for example, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995)). They explain underperformance in terms of investor sentiment that causes 
excessive optimism in the initial stage of the offering. Once the sentiment wears off, returns 
decline to a sustainable equilibrium, and stocks consequently underperform. In essence, the 
poor performance can be attributed to a misinterpretation about the signal of a public offering 
by firms that performed well prior to the offering.  
Since bankrupt firms exhibit poor performance prior to their equity offerings, the 
possibility of the usual overexcitement found in traditional IPOs may be absent. In addition, the 
additional information about bankrupt firms may increase transparency and prevent the hype 
that is associated with some traditional IPOs. Just as there may be less underpricing because of 
less uncertainty surrounding the price, there should be less chance that the market will be 
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overly optimistic about the post-bankruptcy offering. Therefore, we hypothesize that there will 
be a smaller correction (if at all) following post-bankruptcy offerings. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 To test our hypotheses, we compile a data base of post-bankruptcy offerings and a 
control sample of matched traditional IPOs, and apply tests of underpricing and long-term share 
price performance. 
 
A. Data 
The sample consists of equity offerings by firms that filed for and emerged from 
bankruptcy during the period 1985 to 2006. The primary source of information on firms 
emerging from bankruptcy is Lynn M. LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. It is a 
business bankruptcy research tool on the web maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki of 
University of California, Los Angeles Law School.  This database includes all Chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases filed by or against a company, since 1980, such that the company (1) has 
assets worth $100 million or more at the time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and (2) is 
required to file 10-Ks with the SEC. The data are gathered from a variety of sources, the most 
important of which are the bankruptcy courts‟ files (on PACER (Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records) service, which provides the full-text source for bankruptcy documents) and 
the bankrupt company‟s filings with the SEC.  
The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Global New Issues Database provides 
information regarding equity offerings by bankrupt firms on or after their respective emergence 
date. To be included in the sample, a firm must have price and return data in the University of 
Chicago‟s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) post-emergence. Our sample consists 
of 66 firms that conducted a public offering after emerging from bankruptcy.  
 
B.  Methodology for Testing Underpricing 
Underpricing is defined as the offer-to-close return, which is calculated as the 
percentage difference between the offer price and the first-day closing price (Pt): 
 
Offer-to-close return = (Offer Price – Pt)/Offer Price  (1) 
 
C. Multivariate Tests of Underpricing 
To further test whether post-bankruptcy equity offerings are less underpriced than 
traditional IPOs, we use multivariate analysis. The sample includes the post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings and the sample of matched traditional IPOs. A matched traditional IPO is in the same 
year as its corresponding sample firm and is in the same industry and closest in size to the 
sample firm 
The dependent variable is the amount of underpricing. The independent variable of 
interest to test our underpricing hypothesis is BANKRUPT, a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the equity offering is post-bankruptcy, and a value of 0 for traditional IPOs. We expect 
that the BANKRUPT dummy variable should be negative, which reflects less underpricing for 
post-bankruptcy IPOs than traditional IPOs. 
We also control for other characteristics that may affect the underpricing based on 
studies by Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) and Lowry and Schwert (2002): 
 
i. OVERPCT is the over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the deal value. We 
predict a positive relationship between OVERPCT and underpricing, consistent with the 
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hypothesis that investment bankers use the over-allotment option to put upward 
pressure on initial returns to build and maintain good relationships with investors 
(Carter and Dark (1991)). 
ii. NMGR is the number of firms participating in the underwriting process of the issue. As 
explained in Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) a larger number of firms in the 
underwriting process may result in more information to be conveyed to potential 
investors. With more information available, the issue is scrutinized to a greater degree 
and the need for underpricing is lower. Hence, we predict an inverse relationship 
between NMGR and underpricing. 
iii. ∆P is the percentage change between the middle of the initial estimated price range and 
the offer price. In an IPO, adjustment is made to the offering price when new 
information is discovered (see Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) and underpricing rewards 
investors for providing information during road shows. Hanley (1993) documents that 
the difference between the final offer price of an IPO and the initial filing range is 
positively related to the stock‟s subsequent initial return. Hence, we predict a positive 
relationship between the percentage change from initial price to offer price and 
underpricing. 
iv. HOT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the issue occurs between January 1999 and 
December 2000 and 0 otherwise. Our sample period covers the internet bubble period; 
hence, we incorporate an internet bubble dummy to control for market overvaluation 
and timing. We define the “hot” period consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhem (2003), 
and expect that underpricing is higher during this time period. 
The multivariate model is as follows: 
 
)2(54321 iiiiiii HOTPNMGROVERPCTBANKRUPTNGUNDERPRICI  
 
D. Methodology for Testing Long-run Share Price Performance 
Barber and Lyon (1997) calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to estimate 
long-run abnormal returns. A BHAR is measured as the holding period return on the sample 
firm less the holding period return on a comparable asset or portfolio. We compute the BHARs 
over several intervals up to 36 months following the equity offering, and use two benchmarks 
in calculating BHARs: (i) an industry-and-size matched sample of non-equity-issuing firms, 
and (ii) a size-and-book-to-market matched sample of non-equity-issuing firms.  
An industry-and-size matching firm is a firm with the same four-digit SIC code and 
with the market capitalization closest to that of the sample firm, using the closing market 
capitalization on the first day of trading for the equity offering firm, and the market 
capitalization at the end of the previous year for the matching firm. If a matched firm with the 
same four-digit SIC code is not available, the firm with the same three-digit SIC code, and with 
the market capitalization closest to that of the sample firm is chosen. A size- and book-to-
market matching firm is a firm with a market capitalization within 30 percent of the market 
capitalization of the equity offering firm and closest in book-to-market ratio. Firms with a 
market capitalization greater than or less than 30 percent of the market capitalization of the 
post-bankruptcy equity offering firm are not considered as matching firms.  
We also use the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) to calculate 
long-run abnormal returns. The three-factor model is applied by regressing the post-event daily 
excess returns of the equity offering firms on a market factor, a size factor, and a book-to-
market factor as follows: 
 
Equity Offerings by Firms That Emerged from Bankruptcy   (Jory & Madura) 
 
6 
Rit – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit (3) 
 
where, Rit is the daily return on the common stock of firm i, Rft is the return on three-month 
Treasury Bills, Rmt is the return on a value-weighted market index, SMBt is the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large 
stocks, and HMLt is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less 
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The intercept represents 
the mean abnormal return in the event period. We test whether the intercept term is zero in 
order to determine whether the abnormal return is significant. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
In Panel A of Table I, we show the breakdown of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by 
year. The largest number of post-bankruptcy equity offerings occur in year 2004 followed by 
years 1996 and 2005. The years 2003, 2004 and 2005 comprise 40 percent of the total sample 
of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. Only 3 percent of the offerings occur during the hot IPO 
period. 
In Panel B of Table I, we show the distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by 
stock exchange. Fifty-eight percent of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are made by NYSE-
listed firms; 35 percent are made by NASDAQ-listed firms; and, only 8 percent of the offerings 
are made by AMEX-listed firms. 
In Panel C of Table I, we show the use of proceeds from the post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings. The most common cited reason is general corporate use, which represents 29 percent 
of the sample. The second most-cited reason is secondary uses, which represents 23 percent of 
the sample. Other reasons included acquisition financing as the main use of proceeds, 
repayment of debt, and working capital needs. Fourteen percent of the sample firms do not 
mention their planned use of proceeds. 
In Panel D of Table I, we show the occurrence of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by 
industry. The highest number of such offerings is made by air transportation companies. 
Previously bankrupt companies in the oil and gas industry have the second highest number of 
equity offerings post-bankruptcy.  
In Panel E of Table I, we show the lead managers who are involved in the post-
bankruptcy equity offerings. Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers are the most 
involved with 15, 14 and 13 percent of the offerings, respectively.  
Panel F of Table I shows that 73 percent of the post-bankruptcy equity offerings are 
syndicated. Panel G of Table I shows that in 42 percent of the offerings, there are no lock-up 
provisions.  
In Table II, we report summary statistics of various characteristics for the sample of 66 
post-bankruptcy equity offerings. The mean time spent in Chapter 11 bankruptcy by the sample 
firms is 1.75 years and the median is 1.41 years. The mean time period between emergence 
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy to equity offering is 3.48 years with the median equaling 2.20 
years. The mean and median offer prices are $18.97 and $16.38, respectively. The average total 
proceeds from post-bankruptcy equity offerings is $151.47 million and the median is $105.95 
million. The mean over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the total amount offered is 
7.89 percent while the median is 9.39 percent. The mean and median number of lead, co-lead 
and co-managers involved in post-bankruptcy equity offerings are both equal to 3. The mean 
change in mid-file price to offer price is 4 percent while the median is -2 percent. The mean 
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and median gross spreads are both close to 5 percent. The mean and median lead underwriters‟ 
ratings are both equal to 9. 
 
B. Underpricing  
In Table III, we present the results for underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. 
Underpricing is measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing price at the 
end of the offer day. The mean underpricing is 4.49 percent and is significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level. The median underpricing is 1.74 percent. Using both the sign test 
and the Wilcoxon signed rank test, we conclude that the underpricing is significant. Both tests 
are the non-parametric versions of the t-test. 
To test our hypothesis that underpricing is lower for IPOs by firms that emerged from 
bankruptcy, we compare post-bankruptcy equity offerings with traditional IPOs matched on 
offer year and industry. In a second analysis, we compare post-bankruptcy equity offerings to 
traditional IPOs matched on offer year and the size of the issue. The results are presented in 
Table IV.  
In Panel A of Table IV, we compare the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings with traditional IPOs. A matching traditional IPO is conducted in the same year as the 
post-bankruptcy equity offering and in the same industry. If there is more than one match in the 
same industry, we select the one that is closest in size as the matching firm. The mean 
underpricing for the traditional IPOs is 15.53 percent compared to 4.49 percent for the sample 
of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. This difference in underpricing is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
In Panel B of Table IV, we compare the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings with a second set of traditional IPOs. The matching traditional IPO is conducted in 
the same year as the post-bankruptcy equity offering and is closest in issue size to the post-
bankruptcy equity offering. The mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs is 15.80 percent 
compared to 4.49 percent for the sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. This difference in 
underpricing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results in Tables III and IV 
support the hypothesis that the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings is lower than 
the underpricing of traditional IPOs.  
 
C. Multivariate Analysis of Underpricing 
To test whether post-bankruptcy equity offerings are less underpriced than traditional 
IPOs while controlling for other factors, we use multivariate analysis. The analysis is applied to 
the pooled samples containing the post-bankruptcy equity offerings and the matched traditional 
IPOs. A matched traditional IPO is a matching firm that engaged in an IPO in the same year as 
its corresponding sample firm and is either in the same industry or closest in size to the sample 
firm.  
The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is the amount of the underpricing. 
Results are presented in Table V. The coefficient of the variable BANKRUPT is negative and 
significant at the .01 level. This result supports the hypothesis that post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings are less underpriced than traditional IPOs. We attribute this result to less information 
asymmetry with a post-bankruptcy equity offering. In contrast to traditional IPOs, which are 
completely new to the market, post-bankruptcy equity offerings are conducted by firms that 
were once publicly traded. In addition, bankruptcy proceedings provide key information (in the 
form of media-releases, disclosure statement, regular accounts of financial and operating data, 
and a plan of reorganization) to the investing public to reevaluate the firm‟s potential. Hence, 
more information is available about post-bankruptcy equity offerings compared to traditional 
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IPOs. This lower level of information asymmetry results in a lower level of underpricing for 
post-bankruptcy equity offerings. 
There also exists a negative relationship between underpricing and the number of firms 
participating in the underwriting process. As explained in Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001), as the 
number of firms participating in the underwriting process increases, there is the potential for 
more information to be conveyed to investors. With more information available, the issue is 
scrutinized to a greater degree and the need for underpricing is lower. The negative coefficient 
on NMGR in Table V suggests that the same relationship exists in post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings. That is, the higher the number of firms participating in the underwriting process, the 
lower is the underpricing. 
The coefficient of the variable P is positive and statistically significant. P represents 
the adjustment in offer price as the underwriter obtains new information about the equity 
offering. The coefficient on the HOT variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. 
This result suggests a higher level of underpricing during the hot period, which is consistent 
with the findings of Ljungqvist and Wilhem (2003)  
 
D. Long-run Stock Price Performance  
In Table VI, we present the results of BHARs up to 36 months following the equity 
offering. In Table VI, a matching firm is one closest in size and book-to-market, to the sample 
firm. BHARs are calculated for various intervals in months. A month is defined as 21 
consecutive trading days. The first day starts the following day of the issue. 
The t-tests of the mean BHARs are significant for the following holding periods: 1 
month, 3 months, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months. The mean BHARs are all positive. The 
sign tests are significant for the 1-, 6- and 12-month(s) holding periods. The Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests are significant for the 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month(s) periods. The results imply that post-
bankruptcy equity offerings outperform matching firms closest in size and book-to-market.  
In Table VII, we calculate the BHARs using a different set of matching firms, whereby 
a matching firm is one that operates in the same industry as and is closest in size to the equity-
offering firm. The t-tests of the mean BHARs are significant for the 1-, 3- and 36-month(s) 
holding periods. The Wilcoxon signed rank tests yield similar results. Only the 1-month and 
36-months BHARs are significant using the sign test. 
Results from Tables VI and VII contrast sharply with the findings of IPO long-run 
abnormal returns. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document significant negative 
long-run abnormal returns of IPOs. In contrast to traditional IPOs that are completely new to 
the market, post-bankruptcy equity offerings are conducted by firms that were once publicly 
traded. Hence, there exists less information asymmetry with post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
than with traditional IPOs. That may explain why the long-run performance of post-bankruptcy 
equity offerings differs markedly from that of traditional IPOs.  
We also use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to calculate long-run 
abnormal returns post-issuance. Results are presented in Table VIII. The intercept represents 
the mean abnormal return in the one year following the issue. The year begins one day after the 
issue. The market-, size and book-to-market-factors are all significant at the 1 percent level. 
The intercept is not significantly different from zero. There is no evidence of abnormal long-
term share price performance in the year following the post-bankruptcy equity offering. These 
results are consistent with the one-year BHAR reported in Table VII, and differ from results 
reported by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).  
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E. Risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
Even if the sample firms that engage in equity offerings have low underpricing, it is 
possible that they experience volatile stock price movements over time. These firms went 
bankrupt in the past, so any minor hint of weakness could trigger investor concerns. Thus, the 
risk of firms that engage in public stock offerings after emerging from bankruptcy could be 
unusually high. We compare the aftermarket risk characteristics of equity offerings by firms 
that emerged from bankruptcy with: (i) matching IPO firms matched by offer year and size of 
the issue and (ii) matching IPO firms matched by offer year, industry and size of the issue. Risk 
is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the year following the equity 
offering. Results are presented in Table IX. 
The average of the standard deviation of daily returns over the year following the issue 
is 2.87 percent for the sample firms that engage in a public stock offering after emerging from 
bankruptcy (see Panel A of Table IX). The average standard deviation for matching IPO firms 
matched on offer year and size of the issue is 3.71 percent. The average standard deviation for 
matching IPO firms matched on offer year, industry and size of the issue is 3.64 percent.  
In Panel B of Table IX, we compare the average of the standard deviations of post-
bankruptcy equity offerings with the benchmarks. Matching IPO firms matched on offer year 
and size of the issue have a significantly higher standard deviation than equity offerings by 
firms emerging from bankruptcy. The difference in the mean standard deviations is significant 
at the 1 percent level. Thus, the aftermarket risk as measured by stock volatility in the first year 
is lower for equity offerings by firms emerging from bankruptcy than for traditional IPOs.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 When a firm goes bankrupt, entrepreneurship is necessary to restructure it into a new 
business and to finance its operations. We examine the underpricing and long-run equity 
performance of equity offerings by firms that emerge from bankruptcy. We hypothesize that 
uncertainty about the value of such an offering is substantially reduced because of the 
availability of public information prior to the offering. First, such firms previously had publicly 
traded securities and were subject to the SEC disclosure requirements. Second, the dynamics of 
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings provide information to the investing public regarding several 
aspects of the firm‟s assets, liabilities, and governance. Hence, there is substantially more 
information available to investors to assess their valuations after they emerged from 
bankruptcy.  
The mean underpricing of the firms that engaged in public stock offerings after 
emerging from bankruptcy is 4.49 percent, while the mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs 
is 15.53 percent. This difference in underpricing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
which supports our hypothesis. A multivariate analysis that controls for other characteristics 
that could affect the level of underpricing reinforces our findings.  
We also assess the long-term stock price performance following public offerings by 
firms emerging from bankruptcy. The mean BHARs are positive for all holding periods, and 
significant for selected holding periods. The results imply that post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
outperform matching firms. These results contrast sharply with the findings of IPO long-run 
abnormal returns by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and others. We attribute the 
difference to the lower degree of information asymmetry of firms that engage in public stock 
offerings after emerging from bankruptcy. Since there is less hype and underpricing associated 
with these offerings, there is less potential for an aftermarket correction. We also find that the 
aftermarket risk of public offerings by firms emerging from bankruptcy is lower than that of 
traditional IPOs.  
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Table I 
Panel A 
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings by year 
Year n % 
1986 1 2% 
1987 1 2% 
1990 4 6% 
1991 2 3% 
1992 4 6% 
1993 5 8% 
1994 6 9% 
1995 2 3% 
1996 9 14% 
1997 1 2% 
1998 2 3% 
1999 1 2% 
2000 1 2% 
2001 1 2% 
2003 4 6% 
2004 13 20% 
2005 9 14% 
 66 100% 
   
Panel B 
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings by stock exchange 
Exchange n % 
AMEX 5 8% 
NASDAQ 23 35% 
NYSE 38 58% 
 66 100% 
   
(Continued) 
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Table I  
(continued) 
Panel C 
Distribution of Post-Bankruptcy Equity Offerings by use of 
proceeds 
Use of Proceeds n % 
Acquisition Fin. 4 6% 
General Corp. Purposes 19 29% 
Pay on LT Borrowings 1 2% 
Payment on Borrowings 3 5% 
Proceed to Shareholders 1 2% 
Project Finance 1 2% 
Recapitalization 1 2% 
Reduce Indebtedness 1 2% 
Refinancing /Retiring Acquisition related Debt 1 2% 
Refinancing /Retiring Bank Debt 4 6% 
Refinancing /Retiring Fixed Income Debt 3 5% 
Refinancing 1 2% 
Secondary 15 23% 
Working Capital 2 3% 
Unknown 9 14% 
 66 100% 
 
(continued) 
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Table I  
(continued) 
Panel D 
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by industry 
Industry n % 
Air Transportation, Scheduled 6 9% 
Air-Cond & Warm Air Heatg Equip & Common & Indl Refrig Equip 1 2% 
Cement, Hydraulic 2 3% 
Communications Services, NEC 3 5% 
Computer Storage Devices 3 5% 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 1 2% 
Deep Sea & Foreign Transportation of Freight 1 2% 
Drawing & Insulating of Nonferrous Wire 1 2% 
Drilling Oil & Gas Wells 3 5% 
Fabricated Structural Metal Products 3 5% 
Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 1 2% 
Glass Containers 1 2% 
Hospital & Medical Service Plans 1 2% 
Hotels & Motels 1 2% 
Jewelry, Precious Metal 2 3% 
Life Insurance 1 2% 
Local & Suburban Transit & Interurban Hway Passenger Trans 2 3% 
Meat Packing Plants 1 2% 
Metal Forgings & Stampings 2 3% 
Mining Machinery & Equip (No Oil & Gas Field Mach & Equip) 2 3% 
Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories 1 2% 
Natural Gas Transmission & Distribution 1 2% 
Oil & Gas Field Machinery & Equipment 2 3% 
Oil & Gas Field Services, NEC 1 2% 
Operative Builders 1 2% 
Pharmaceutical Preparations 3 5% 
Printing Trades Machinery & Equipment 1 2% 
Retail-Department Stores 2 3% 
Retail-Grocery Stores 1 2% 
Retail-Variety Stores 1 2% 
Sausages & Other Prepared Meat Products 1 2% 
Services - General Medical & Surgical Hospitals (NEC) 2 3% 
Services - Miscellaneous Business Services 1 2% 
Services - Motion Picture Theaters 2 3% 
Services-Skilled Nursing Care Facilities 1 2% 
Steel Works, Blast Furnaces & Rolling Mills (Coke Ovens) 3 5% 
Telephone Communications (No Radiotelephone) 1 2% 
Wood Household Furniture, (No Upholstered) 3 5% 
 66 100% 
(continued) 
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Table I  
(continued) 
Panel E 
Distribution of lead underwriters in post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
Lead Managers  n % 
Alex Brown & Sons Inc 1 1% 
BA Securities Inc 1 1% 
Banc of America Securities LLC 1 1% 
Bear Stearns & Co Inc 4 5% 
Citigroup 2 2% 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp 3 4% 
CS First Boston Corp 2 2% 
DA Davidson & Co Inc 1 1% 
Deutsche Bank Securities Corp. 1 1% 
First Boston Corp 1 1% 
Goldman Sachs & Co 13 15% 
Jefferies & Co Inc 1 1% 
JP Morgan & Co Inc 3 4% 
Lehman Brothers 4 5% 
MDB Capital Corp 1 1% 
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 12 14% 
Morgan Keegan Inc 1 1% 
Morgan Stanley 1 1% 
Salomon Brothers Inc 11 13% 
Sanders Morris Harris Inc 1 1% 
Smith Barney Incorporated 4 5% 
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co 2 2% 
Stephens Inc 2 2% 
UBS Investment Bank 5 6% 
US Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc 1 1% 
Wertheim Schroder & Co (UK) 1 1% 
   
Panel F 
Syndicated versus non-syndicated post-bankruptcy equity 
offerings 
Syndicated n % 
No 18 27% 
Yes 48 73% 
 66 100% 
Panel G 
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by lock-up 
provisions 
Lock-up Provision n % 
No 28 42% 
Yes 38 58% 
 66 100% 
 
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Details of the sample are as 
reported in SDC. Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. 
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Table II 
Summary statistics of characteristics of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
 n Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Duration (Year) 66 1.75 1.41 1.39 0.08 6.86 
Number of years from Ch. 11 
emergence to offer 66 3.48 2.20 3.53 0.03 16.80 
Offer Price (US$) 66 18.97 16.38 12.87 1.00 69.00 
Proceeds (US$ Mil) 66 151.47 105.95 199.52 12.50 1428.00 
Overallotment amount sold as a % of 
amount offered 66 7.89 9.39 6.86 0.00 15.00 
Number of lead, co-lead & co-
managers 66 3.09 3.00 1.70 1.00 9.00 
Percent change mid-file price to offer 
price 66 0.04 -0.02 0.44 -0.49 3.06 
Percent gross spread 56 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.08 
Average lead underwriter(s) rating 60 8.58 9.00 0.88 4.86 9.00 
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. 
Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. Related statistics are collected 
either from SDC or Bankruptcy Research Database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III 
First-day underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
Underpricing n Mean Median t value POS:NEG Sign M Signed Rank S 
OFFER TO CLOSE 66 4.49% 1.74% 4.43*** 16:50 22.5 673 
    (p<0.0001)  (p<0.0001) (p<0.0001) 
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt 
firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. OFFER TO CLOSE is the difference between the 
offer price and the closing price on the day of the offer. Offer prices are collected from SDC. Trading prices are collected 
from CRSP. All tests examine whether the sample mean significantly differs from zero. 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table IV 
Comparison of the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings to traditional IPOs 
Panel A 
Underpricing of: n Mean Median t value 
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings 66 4.49% 1.74% 4.43*** 
    (p<0.0001) 
Matching traditional IPOs 66 15.53% 7.04% 6.54*** 
    (p<0.0001) 
Difference  66 11.03% 5.30% 4.25*** 
    (p<0.0001) 
     
Panel B 
Underpricing of: n Mean Median t value 
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings 66 4.49% 1.74% 4.43*** 
    (p<0.0001) 
Matching traditional IPOs 66 15.80% 5.21% 4.31*** 
    (p<0.0001) 
Difference  66 11.31% 3.47% 2.94*** 
    (p=0.0046) 
This table compares the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings with traditional IPOs. In 
Panel A, the traditional IPO is a matching firm that conducted an equity offering in the same year as the 
corresponding sample firm and in the same industry. In Panel B, the traditional IPO is a matching firm 
that conducted an equity offering in the same year as the corresponding sample firm and is closest in 
size to the sample firm. The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings and matching traditional IPOs 
are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt firms are identified in 
Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. Underpricing is measured as the difference between 
the offer price and the closing price on the day of the offer. Offer prices are collected from SDC. 
Trading prices are collected from CRSP.  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 
 
19 
 
 
Table V 
Cross-sectional analysis of underpricing  
Variables Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.1660 5.870
***
 <.0001 
BANKRUPT -0.0903 -3.640
***
 0.0004 
OVERPCT 0.0362 0.480 0.6312 
NMGR -0.0133 -1.800
*
 0.0744 
P 0.0657 1.820
*
 0.0704 
HOT 0.1606 2.260
**
 0.0253 
n 132   
R-square 0.1786   
F 5.48   
Pr > F 0.0001   
The sample of 66 post-bankruptcy equity offerings and their matching original IPOs is from 
the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. A matched original IPO is a 
matching firm that conducted an IPO in the same year as its corresponding sample firm and 
is in the same industry and closest in size to the sample firm. Bankrupt firms are identified 
in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. The dependent variable is 
UNDERPRICING and is measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing 
price on the day of the offer. The independent variables are: (i) a dummy variable to 
indicate that the equity offering is conducted by a previously bankrupt firm (BANKRUPT), 
(ii) the over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the deal value (OVERPCT); (iii) the 
number of firms participating in the underwriting process (NMGR); (iv) the percentage 
change from the middle of the original price and the offer price (P); and, (v) the hot 
period (HOT). Robust standard errors for OLS regression parameter estimates are used. 
***
 denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
**
 denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
*
 denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table VI 
Buy and hold abnormal returns of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
 n Mean Median t value POS:NEG Sign M Signed Rank S 
BHAR 1 MONTH 65 5.10% 3.60% 2.94*** 42:23 9.50** 417.50*** 
    (0.0046)  (0.0248) (0.0054) 
BHAR 3 MONTHS 62 11.20% 5.04% 2.83*** 37:25 6.00 342.50** 
    (0.0063)  (0.1619) (0.0151) 
BHAR 6 MONTHS 58 11.73% 9.91% 2.22** 37:21 8.00** 298.50** 
    (0.0305)  (0.0479) (0.0195) 
BHAR 12 MONTHS 55 18.55% 21.42% 2.10** 36:19 8.50** 263.00** 
    (0.0403)  (0.0300) (0.0262) 
BHAR 24 MONTHS 38 33.47% 20.35% 1.98* 22:16 3.00 91.50 
    (0.0558)  (0.4177) (0.1882) 
BHAR 36 MONTHS 32 12.88% 42.31% 0.39 17:15 1.00 24.00 
    (0.7020)  (0.8601) (0.6608) 
This table shows the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. A BHAR is simply a 
holding period return on the sample firm less the holding period return on a matching firm. For each sample firm, the 
matching firm is the one closest in size and book-to-market, respectively. Both stock prices and the number of shares 
outstanding are collected from CRSP. A firm‟s book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of the book value of common 
equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) divided by the market value of equity. The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s 
Bankruptcy Research Database.  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table VII 
Buy and hold abnormal returns of post-bankruptcy equity offerings 
 n Mean Median t value POS:NEG Sign M Signed Rank S 
BHAR 1 MONTH 65 5.53% 5.07% 3.25*** 45:20 12.50*** 446.50*** 
    (0.0018)  (0.0026) (0.0028) 
BHAR 3 MONTHS 62 8.15% 4.78% 1.98* 35:27 4.00 236.50* 
    (0.0519)  (0.3742) (0.0976) 
BHAR 6 MONTHS 58 7.21% -1.05% 1.28 28:30 -1.00 160.50 
    (0.2062)  (0.8957) (0.2169) 
BHAR 12 MONTHS 55 13.52% 14.21% 1.53 32:23 4.50 155.00 
    (0.1310)  (0.2806) (0.1967) 
BHAR 24 MONTHS 38 23.00% -2.73% 1.48 17:21 -2.00 48.50 
    (0.1466)  (0.6271) (0.4892) 
BHAR 36 MONTHS 32 48.64% 25.08% 2.16** 23:9 7.00** 130.00** 
    (0.0383)  (0.0201) (0.0126) 
This table shows the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. A BHAR is simply a 
holding period return on the sample firm less the holding period return on a matching firm. For each sample firm, the 
matching firm is the one closest in size with the same SIC code as the sample firm. Size is calculated as the stock price times 
the number of shares outstanding. Both stock prices and the number of shares outstanding are collected from CRSP. The 
sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt 
firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database.  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
 
 
Table VIII 
Long-run abnormal returns using Fama-French calendar-time model 
 Estimate OLS t value  
Heteroscedasticity 
consistent t value  
Intercept (Abnormal Return) -0.0003 -0.52  -0.52  
b(p) 1.4275 19.15 *** 14.63 *** 
s(p) 0.6353 6.29 *** 3.49 *** 
h(p) 1.1771 8.65 *** 5.77 *** 
R-squared 0.0921     
This table shows the results from applying the three-factor model as developed by Fama and French 
(1993). The three-factor model is applied by regressing the 253 post-event daily excess returns for firm i 
on a market factor [b(p)], a size factor [s(p)], and a book-to-market factor [h(p)] as explained in Fama and 
French (1993). To calculate the excess return, the three-month Treasury Bills are used. The intercept 
represents the mean daily abnormal return over the 253 days starting one day after the equity offering for 
the sample of 66 post-bankruptcy equity offerings. 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table IX 
Comparison of post-issuance risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offering to alternative benchmarks 
Panel A 
The standard deviations of daily returns of: n Mean Median t Value  Pr > |t|  
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings (PBEO) 66 2.87% 2.69%*** 16.14 <.0001  
IPOs matched by size 66 3.71% 2.99%*** 12.04 <.0001  
IPOs matched by industry and size 66 3.64% 3.54%*** 24.07 <.0001  
CRSP Value Weighted Market Index 66 0.74% 0.68%*** 22.00 <.0001  
CRSP Equally Weighted Market Index 66 0.60% 0.57%*** 24.56 <.0001  
       
Panel B 
The differences in standard deviations of daily 
returns of: n Mean Median t Value Sign M Signed Rank S 
PBEO – IPOs matched by size 66 -0.84% -0.63% -4.15 -15 -622.5 
    (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) 
PBEO – IPOs matched by industry and size 66 -0.77% -0.94% -3.64 -14 -640.5 
    (0.0005) (0.0008) (<.0001) 
PBEO – CRSP Value Weighted Market Index 66 2.13% 1.86% 13.13 33 1105.5 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
PBEO – CRSP Equally Weighted Market Index 66 2.27% 2.00% 13.54 33 1105.5 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
This table shows the risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offerings and benchmarks over the 252 days starting 1 day after the 
issue. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the daily returns. Returns data are collected from CRSP. The first benchmark 
consists of IPOs matched by offer year and size. The second benchmark consists of IPOs matched by offer year, SIC codes and 
size. The third benchmark is the CRSP Value Weighted Market Index. The fourth benchmark is the CRSP Equally Weighted 
Market Index.  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
